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We estimate the impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on crime and security 
perceptions in Mexico. For this purpose, we combine surveys on crime victimization with 
indicators of where drug cartels operate with and without drug-related homicides. Using the 
difference-in-difference estimator, we find that people living in areas that experienced drug-
related homicides are more likely to take extra precautions to guard their security, yet these 
areas also more likely to experience some crimes, particularly thefts and extortions. In 
contrast, these crimes and perceptions of unsafety do not change in areas where cartels 
operate without leading to drug-related homicides. 
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As the new millennium approached, Mexican drug cartels started suddenly fighting for territory, 
leading to the death of 63,000 people between 2006 and 2012 (SNSP, 2011; Molzahn et al., 2013). In 
parallel to this unprecedented wave of drug-related homicides, crime in Mexico also rose, directly 
affecting about 14 percent of households.
1
 Not surprisingly, the majority of the Mexican population 
(77%) identifies drug-cartel violence and crime as the country’s most important problems.2  
This paper contributes to the existing debates on the socio-economic impact of drug cartels by 
identifying to what extent crime and perceptions of unsafety have changed in areas where drug cartels 
operate with and without turf conflict leading to drug-related homicides. The literature has so far 
found consistent evidence that poverty, unemployment rates and migration outflows have increased in 
areas that have experienced drug-related homicides (Dell, 2011; BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; 
Robles et al., 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo, 2014; Ríos, 2014b). These previous studies argue 
that the violent environment, along with the increase of thefts and extortions of local populations, 
could potentially be driving these results. However, up to date there is no evidence of the extent to 
which these crimes increased as a direct result of drug cartels operating in certain areas, or as a result 
of cartels battling for turf, which potentially could have induced these cartels to tax local populations 
to fund their ongoing conflict. Our aim in this paper is to bridge this gap. We also contribute to the 
literature by assessing to what extent people living in areas where drug cartels operate (with and 
without drug-related homicides) changed their perceptions of unsafety and took action to prevent 
being victims of crime.  
To answer our research questions we use the nationally representative crime victimization 
survey Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad (ENSI) conducted in 2005 and 2010. This survey 
provides information about respondents’ perceptions on unsafety and the crimes they have 
experienced, including those that were not officially reported. To identify where drug cartels have 
operated with and without drug-related homicides at municipality level we use the data collected by 
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Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014), who monitored official records, media reports and specialized 
blogs from 2000 until 2010. We also use the official statistics on drug-related homicides which give 
account of the location and number of people who died as a direct result of the confrontation among 
cartels (90%) and those with the state authority, available only from December 2006 until September 
2011 (SNSP, 2011).   
We use the difference-in-difference estimator in order to build the counterfactual of what 
would have happened to the crime rates and perceptions of unsafety had the cartels and their 
associated homicides not existed. We estimate separately two types of impacts. 
First, to assess the impact of drug cartels operating ‘peacefully’ we focus only on areas that 
have not had drug-related homicides at any point during the period 2000-2010. Among these areas 
free-of drug-related homicides we estimate the change in outcomes in municipalities before they had 
any cartels operating (2000-2005) and after cartels settled in these areas (in 2006 or afterwards). That 
change in outcomes is compared to the one experienced in areas that did not have cartels or drug-
related homicides over the same periods. 
Second, we separately estimate the impact of drug-related homicides. For this purpose, we 
estimate the change in outcomes in municipalities before they had any drug-related homicides (2000-
2005) and after they experienced drug-related homicides in these areas for the first time (in 2006 or 
afterwards). That change in outcomes is compared to the one experienced in areas that did not have 
drug-related homicides at any point over the same periods. 
The presence of drug cartels and their related homicides is by no means randomly allocated. 
Thus, a simple comparison in outcomes between respondents living in municipalities where cartels 
operate and those used as control group are likely to over- or under- estimate the impact of drug cartels 
and their associated violence. To address the potential endogeneity of where cartels chose to operate 
peacefully and not we combine the difference-in-difference estimator with instrumental variables. We 
use as instrumental variable whether the municipality shared the same ruling party as its corresponding 
state government. This kind of political decentralization has been shown in previous research to be 
strongly correlated with the probability of municipalities experiencing drug cartels and drug-related 
homicides, and has also been used as an instrument to deal with the endogeneity of drug-related 
 3 
activities in Mexico (Ríos, 2012; Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo, 2014; Ríos, 2014a). We also interact 
the variable decentralization with a dummy variable denoting the period during which both the 
Mexican and the Colombian governments changed their strategy to combat drug cartels (in 2006 and 
afterwards). These policies, called ‘war on drugs’, are also regarded as key contributors to the 
Mexican drug-related casualties (Dell, 2011; Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011a; Castillo et al., 2012; Lessing, 
2012; Osorio, 2012; Robles et al., 2013). 
 Our results reveal a contrasting picture as to where crime, and perceptions of unsafety, 
change. On the one hand, people living in areas where cartels are battling for turf (with evidence of 
drug-related homicides) feel more unsafe and take additional precautions to guard their security. 
Despite these extra precautions, these areas are still more likely to experience certain types of crimes, 
particularly thefts and extortions. On the other hand, these crimes and the perceptions of unsafety do 
not change in areas where cartels operate without drug-related homicides. Thus, our findings deepen 
the understanding as to when cartels’ drug-trafficking activities lead to other crimes and some of the 
consequences on the local population. 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the reasons behind the conflict among 
Mexican cartels, its potential links to crime, and presents a sequential game illustrating this link. 
Section 3 presents the data used. Section 4 shows the impact of drug cartels and drug-related 
homicides on crime and perceptions of unsafety. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Crime and war on drugs  
It is well known that drug cartels had operated in Mexico for several decades without leading to major 
scale of violence. The peaceful coexistence among cartels was kept thanks to an unwritten pact 
criminal organizations had with some members of the 70-year ruling party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Astorga and Shirk, 2011). In exchange for bribes, these agreements 
allowed cartels to operate in certain areas, known as plazas, as long as cartels kept a low profile, 
meaning that no violence, crime or drug-selling were targeted towards the local population (Campbell, 
2009; Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011a). The strong hegemony that the PRI had across all spheres of 
government, allowed the party to effectively punish cartels that violated these agreements with arrests 
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or killing of their leaders, without ever leading to a violent retaliation from cartels (Ríos, 2012). Why 
then, did the drug-related violence surge and spread across the country in recent years? 
 In 2000 the PRI lost for the first time the presidential election to the National Action Party 
(PAN), as well as several other local and state elections. As the hegemony of the PRI weakened, 
cartels suddenly started fighting for territory. It is estimated that 6,680 people got killed, mostly cartel 
members, between 2000 and 2005 (Ríos and Shrik, 2011). An even higher wave of drug-related 
homicides followed soon after the controversial victory of Felipe Calderón (backed by PAN) in the 
presidential elections of 2006. Calderón won amid allegations of rigging. So, in order to regain 
credibility, some argue, Calderón launched a new strategy against drug cartels (Ravelo, 2012). 
Calderón’s administration soon after taking office dispatched the army to combat cartels in their 
strongholds and arrested more drug cartel leaders than ever before (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011a). Dell 
(2011) using regression discontinuity finds that PAN Mayors were more likely to request enforcement 
assistance against cartels from the federal government than Mayors from other parties, thereby 
increasing crackdowns against cartels. These crackdowns although temporarily beheaded criminal 
organizations, divided them into smaller factions leading to violent confrontations among each other.
3
  
 In parallel to Calderón’s policies, Colombia also intensified indictments of drug shipments 
and destruction of drug processing labs, which induced cartels to shift their operations towards Mexico 
(Castillo et al., 2012). These cartels positioned themselves particularly in areas well connected and in 
close proximity to the north-border or pacific coast where they could transport drug-shipments which 
fuelled even more violence as they disputed plazas where other cartels already operated. 
 The ‘war on drugs’ policies implemented, in both Colombia and Mexico, triggered 
unprecedented levels of violence thanks to another change in Mexican politics. Singe the beginning of 
the new millennium, more local areas for the first time had a different ruling party than their respective 
state and federal governments. This political decentralization, meant that the informal agreements that 
drug cartels had with some politicians and local police were more difficult to coordinate and honor  as 
PAN and new parties lacked the connections or ability to enforce previously established agreements 
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 While in 2005 there were six major drug cartels, by 2010, there were 16 (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011a).   
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with cartels (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009; Ríos, 2012; Ríos 2014a). So cartels started fighting 
among themselves to retain the control over their plazas.  
 In sum, drug cartels in Mexico have operated under two types of regimes, each reaching very 
different results.  Under what we define as the ‘hegemonic’ regime, the one that prevailed under the 
70-year ruling PRI, cartels reached agreements with some members of the local and state authority 
leading to a peaceful coexistence of cartels in exchange for bribes and as long as cartels followed set 
rules of conduct. Under the more recently implemented ‘decentralized’ regime, there could be 
coordination failures within the local and state-authority. Thus, previous agreements between some 
members of the authority allowing cartels to operate in an area are more difficult to reach and honor. 
The fragility of these agreements has led to cartels fighting for turf and ignoring any previously 
established rules of conduct.  
 Under both types of regime, the main profits from drug cartels are likely to be derived from 
drug-trafficking, otherwise they would switch activity altogether. Nonetheless, cartels might have 
different incentives to combine their core activity of drug-trafficking with other criminal activities 
depending upon the rewards and penalties they might face.  
 In the hegemonic regime, the corrupt institutions that allow the operation of these cartels 
might increase the perception of unsafety, especially if the presence of these cartels leads to more 
crime. Crime could for instance increase if drugs become more readily available in these areas. The 
international evidence however, shows a mixed correlation between drug availability, drug 
dependency and crime. Whilst studies looking at the prevalence of drug-consumption among prisoners 
have found a positive correlation, this does not necessarily prove there is a causal relationship between 
drug use and crime (OID, 2012). Other studies looking at the drug-consumption among the general 
population have not found a consistent positive correlation between drugs and crime.
4
 However, 
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 For instance, Washington D.C. has a murder rate that is five times higher than the one in New York City, and 
also higher rates of forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary and motor vehicle theft (MPDC, 2011; 
FBI, 2013). Nonetheless, these two cities have the same prevalence of crack users, and heroin use is actually 
lower in Washington D.C. than in New York City (Stevens and Bewley-Taylor, 2009: 4). 
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studies specifically conducted for areas dedicated to drug-production -as is the case now in Mexico- 
show that there might be a stronger link between drug production and criminality. For instance, Mejia 
and Restrepo (2013) find that in Colombia cocaine production activities explain 36% of homicide 
rates, 66% of forced displacement rates and 43% of the attacks by illegal armed groups. Hence it is 
uncertain, whether, and if so to what extent, crime could increase in areas where cartels maintain the 
monopoly of a plaza to traffic drugs relatively freely.  
 Previous research has shown that the probability of dealing cocaine within Mexico actually 
increases when municipal and state governments are ruled by different political parties (Ríos, 2014b). 
Thus, we would expect that if indeed drug availability increases crime, it will do so even more under 
the decentralized case. There are other reasons why cartels’ drug-trafficking activities could lead to 
more crime under the ‘decentralized’ regime. Although cartels might still bribe some members of the 
authority to be given plazas, these might not be tenable in the long-run due to the coordination 
failures.  For instance, a cartel might get protection from some members of the local authority but not 
from the state authority. Since the monopoly of the plaza is no longer guaranteed other cartels might 
intend to take over, triggering a turf war among cartels, and perhaps with the authority in retaliation 
for not allowing them to operate freely.
5
 Mexican cartels as a result, have resorted to hiring militias, 
usually deserters of the police or army, local gangs and former prisoners. Since the hiring of these 
armed groups and fighting is not a cheap strategy, the increase of criminality in some areas could be 
the result of cartels extorting civilians to fund cartels’ ongoing battles. 
 Under the decentralized regime, as the probability of cartels being chased and arrested 
increases, so does the temporary beheading of these groups. When a criminal organization loses its 
leader, its ability to control all the members working directly or indirectly for the cartel might also be 
weakened. Thus, the specialized “cells” hired to provide protection to the cartel may become free to 
pursue their own criminal objectives, disobeying any internal rules of conduct the cartel might have 
established to avoid attracting unwanted attention from the authority. 
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 For instance, Castillo et al. (2012) find that there are more drug-related homicides in Mexican municipalities 
that have two or more cartels.   
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 The so called legitimization-habituation hypothesis in the criminology literature can also 
explain why crime could have increased as a result of drug cartels experiencing conflict. This 
hypothesis suggests that the violence generated by high density conflict devaluates human life, 
legitimizing violence (Archer and Gartner, 1984). This is one of the reasons why crime rates increase 
in countries after suffering violent conflicts and terrorist acts (Archer and Gartner, 1984; Landau and 
Pfeffermann, 1988). Anthropological studies in Mexico have shown that the increasing presence of 
drug traffickers in some areas has contributed towards the habituation of the narco-culture (Trabajo de 
campo en tiempos violentos, 2011). Profits from drug-trafficking are flaunted as a source of pride and 
status. As illegal activities become a way of life in the areas affected by drug-trafficking, the value that 
people place in earning a living from legitimate sources could be reduced, incentivizing some towards 
committing other types of crimes. 
 
2.1 A simple sequential game  
We summarize our theoretical discussion on the impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on 
crime using a sequential game. 
 Assume we have two types of players, a local authority ar and organized drug cartels, or which 
can be operating under two types of regimes r {1,2}. In the first of these regimes, the local authority is 
decentralized, meaning that it does not share the same ruling party as a higher up state government. In 
the second type of regime, a coordinated regime, the local authority shares the same ruling party as the 
state government. 
 In the first stage of the game, nature decides the regime r of the local authority and that 
becomes common knowledge to all players. In the second stage of the game, cartels will bribe the 
local authority some positive amount, , in exchange for permission to operate in the area trafficking 
drugs, which render cartels an income of >0, discounting the bribe given.6  
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 According to official estimates, about 60 per cent of the Mexican police force is under cartels’ payroll, costing 
cartels more than a billion dollars annually to bribe just the local police (Keefe, 2012; Salinas de Gortari, 2012).  
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 Since drug-trafficking is officially illegal, the authority will grant the permission to the cartels 
to operate in exchange for the bribe , under the condition that the cartel commits no crimes, which 
could render cartels an extra source of revenue , where <.  
 Under the coordinated regime, the local authority has the prerogative to seize drugs from time 
to time in order to keep the impression of abiding by the rule of law to the general population. The 
authority pays for this signal of law abiding a cost c>0. In case the cartel disobeys the rules of 
conduct, and commits crime in the areas which we assume there is perfect information on such 
violations, the cartel will be charged a penalty of >0, which can be imposed by either arresting the 
cartel’s leader or expropriating its property. 
 Under the decentralized regime, the local authority also needs to keep the impression of 
abiding by the rule of law to the population and will also pay for these signals a positive cost d, where 
cd. 
If the authority is decentralized it can no longer guarantee that the cartel’s activities will not be 
found out by the state authority, so cartels face the risk of paying a penalty   with a probability, p, 
regardless of whether they follow the rules of conduct of the local authority or not.  
Given the coordination failures in the decentralized regime, the local authority cannot 
guarantee the protection of the cartel from potential rival cartels wanting to operate in the area. Hence, 
cartels working under the decentralized regime will have to invest an amount v, to secure themselves 
from potential challengers. 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the potential payoffs to the authority and cartels under the two types 
of regimes. The dominant strategy in the coordinated regime will be that cartels follow the rules of 
conduct and do not commit crimes if the penalty is high enough, <. In the decentralized regime the 
dominant strategy will be for cartels to combine their drug activities with committing other crimes, 
since that extra income from extorting the population, , can cover their expenses on hiring services to 
protect themselves from potential transgressions v and in case they have to pay a penalty .  
In this game we have depicted the actions that cartels might take under different regimes. 
Citizens as a result might also change their behavior, taking more security precautions in areas where 
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crime is increasing, which as a result might reduce or level crime rates. Proponents of the cohesion 
hypothesis argue that external threats may increase social cohesion within society, thereby leading to a 
reduction of other internal conflicts like crime (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). External threats might 
induce people to contribute more towards the group’s welfare, such as by investing more time, effort 
and sharing resources (Bornstein, 2003). In the case of Mexico some vigilante groups have emerged in 
areas most affected by drug-related homicides. However, some of these vigilante groups have resorted 
to arming themselves and have themselves become organized criminal groups. That is the case with 
the La Familia movement in Michoacán, which started as a vigilante group and later on became a 
fierce drug cartel.  
 
3. Victimization survey and drug cartels activity data  
To estimate the impact of drug cartels and their associated homicides on crime we use the nationally 
representative crime victimization survey Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad (ENSI) conducted in 
2005 and 2010 by the Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) and the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). The ENSI in each of these years drew a new, but still 
comparable and nationally representative sample of the adult population aged 18 or older across the 32 
Mexican States. Specifically, 57,398 people were interviewed in 2005 and other 60,461 in 2010. 
 Respondent’s characteristics remained similar over time, in terms of their age, gender and 
occupation (Table A.1 in appendix). The percentage of respondents that stated a member of their 
household had been a victim of crime increased from 10.3% in 2005 to nearly 14% in 2010 (Table 
A.1). 
 The survey identifies who had been a victim of crimes by asking “Over last year, were you 
victim of a crime?” Those who answered positively, were then asked the following open-ended 
question: “Which crime(s) was that?”, followed by “In which state and municipality did this crime 
occur?” The survey segments the responses on crime victimization in 12 categories: car theft, theft of 
car accessories, house burglary, mugging, kidnapping, lesions, sexual crime, fraud, extortion, other 
kind of thefts and other kinds of crimes. Table A.2 shows the frequency with which each of the major 
crimes was reported. Car theft, theft of car’s accessories, mugging, extortions, fraud and other thefts 
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all increased from 2005 to 2010. Among the major crimes analyzed, only house burglary, lesions and 
sexual crimes dropped across the country. It is worth noting that only 41 kidnappings were reported in 
2005 and also in 2010. This small number contrasts with the official statistics available at state level, 
which suggest kidnappings significantly increased across the country for the period of our analysis 
(Saldierna, 2010). The reason for this apparent contradiction might be due to the fact that the ENSI 
survey asks respondents themselves whether they were the victims of kidnapping. Given the low rate 
of kidnapping liberations, a very different statistic would have been obtained if instead respondents 
had been asked if a family member was kidnapped. 
 The survey also asks respondents about their perceptions on unsafety and actions taken to 
guard against crimes. Table A.3 shows that the percentage of respondents that believes crime in their 
municipality increased went up from 41% in 2005 to 55% in 2010. The percentage of respondents that 
do not trust the local police increased from an already high figure of 77% in 2005 to 90% in 2010.  
 
3.1 Drug cartels activity data 
To identify the impact of cartels and their associated homicides on crime and perceptions we combine 
the ENSI survey data with indicators on which municipalities have experienced drug cartels and drug-
related homicides. 
 There are no official statistics on where drug cartels operate. Thus, we use the data collected 
by Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). These authors identified where cartels operated at 




 To identify which municipalities have experienced drug-related homicides we use two data 
sources. Given that there are no official statistics on drug-related homicides for the period 2000-2005 
we also use the data above collected by Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014).  For the period 2006-
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 Coscia and Ríos (2012) have estimated the location as where drug-cartels operate at municipality level using an 
automated online search algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, these authors have not made public their 
database.  
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2010 we use the official data on the number of casualties attributed directly to the drug-related conflict 
among cartels and the state-authority provided at municipality level and on a daily basis (SNSP, 
2011). Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014) find that for the period during which there are official 
statistics, 63 municipalities experienced drug-related homicides attributed to confrontations among 
cartels or with the state authority in the media but were not recorded in the official statistics. From 
these 63 municipalities only 19 were sampled in the ENSI survey.  We eliminate these 19 areas with 
conflicting information from our analysis to minimize a potential contamination of our control groups, 
as well as in order to keep a consistent definition of treatment for the post-treatment period (2006-
2010). 
 
3.2 Selection of treatment and control groups 
 We focus on estimating the impact of drug cartels operating in municipalities for the first time in 2006 
or afterwards, and separately the impact in municipalities experiencing drug-related homicides for the 
first time in 2006 or afterwards.   
 A caveat of our chosen periods of focus is that we exclude from our analysis areas that have 
experienced drug cartels or drug-related violence previous to 2006. Nonetheless, we gain in precision 
by being able to separately estimate the impact of cartels and their violence for a period in which many 
drug cartels spread their activities and killings to new areas across the country. 
 The ENSI in 2005 and 2010 sampled 1,029 out of the 2,456 municipalities in the country.  
From these sampled municipalities we exclude all respondents interviewed in 195 municipalities for 
having experienced drug-related homicides during 2000-2005, and another 19 municipalities for 
having experienced drug-related homicides during 2006-2010 according to the media, but not in the 
official statistics. In Figure 2 we show in a map the municipalities (202) we exclude from our analysis, 
and those (827) that remained in our analysis (shown in black in the map). 
 We further split the municipalities surveyed in ENSI into two types of treatments, each with 
its respective control group. In table A.1 we show the number of respondents in each of the 
municipalities used as treatment and control groups. 
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Impact of drug-related homicides: treatment and control groups 
Figure 3 shows the treatment and control groups used to measure the impact of drug-related 
homicides. The figure shows the 507 treated municipalities which experienced for the first time at least 
one drug-related homicide during 2006-2010, according to official records (and that at no point during 
2000-2005 experienced drug-related homicides). The control group, shown in the darkest color, is 
composed by the 39 sampled municipalities that did not experience any drug-related homicides at any 
point during 2000-2010.  
 In Figure 3 we also show the treated municipalities that are in the top 10 decile according to 
their drug-related homicides rate per 100,000 inhabitants over 2006-2010. These areas have a 
considerably higher drug-related homicide rate (227.8 killings per 100,000 inhabitants) than the rest of 
the treated municipalities (25.5 killings per 100,000 inhabitants).  
 
Impact of drug cartels: treatment and control groups 
Figure 4 shows the treatment and control groups used to measure the impact of drug cartels. In the 
lighter color we show the 43 treated municipalities that experienced for the first time drug cartels 
operating in their areas during the period 2006-2010, but that at no point during 2000-2010 
experienced drug-related homicides. Only one of these treated municipalities has two cartels operating 
simultaneously in the area. The rest (42) of these treated municipalities have only one cartel operating. 
Also in Figure 3, in black color, we show the location of the 271 municipalities used as a control 
group, which did not experience drug cartels or drug-related homicides during 2000-2010. 
 
4. Impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides 
In this section we estimate the impact of drug cartels and separately the impact of drug-related 
homicides on crime and perceptions of unsafety. To take into account observed and unobserved 
characteristics that might affect the change in our outcome variables we combine the difference-in-
difference estimator with instrumental-variables, Z, and a panel fixed effects regression at municipality 
level, as shown in equation (1). Across all the regression specifications in this section we use the 
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sampling weights provided by the ENSI survey to take into account the representation of the 
respondent in the sample. 
 
                                     E(Yijt |Zijt)= α + δXijt + ρMij +Treatedijt*Postit + Postit + ijt                      (1) 
where Yijt represents the outcome variable of interest, such as crime, of survey respondent i at time t in 
municipality j. X is a vector of the respondent’s characteristics. M is a vector of time varying 
characteristics of the area. Post is a dummy variable on whether the observation is for the post-
treatment period (2006 or after) or not. ijt represents the error term. The difference-in-difference 
effect  is the coefficient of the interaction between Post and the dummy variable Treated, which 
indicates whether the person was affected in a municipality treated by drug-related cartels (or drug-
related homicides). Since the location where drug cartels operate might be endogenously determined 
with crime levels, we control for that potential endogeneity using instrumental variables.  
 As instrumental variable Z, we use the interaction between the variable Post and the dummy 
variable Decentralized, which indicates whether the municipality’s local government had the same 
ruling party as its corresponding state government in 2005. As mentioned before, we use this 
instrument as the literature suggests that municipalities that were decentralized right before 2006 were 
more likely to have experienced drug-related homicides soon after. Since we are using instrumental 
variables, the difference-in-difference effect is estimating the local average effect of the treatment 
(LATE) on outcomes for those whose treatment has been changed by the instrument Z. 
The respondent’s characteristics we control for (gender, age, whether has high school or 
higher level of education attainment, whether is an entrepreneur and size of household) are those that 
the international literature has found to be related to the probability of experiencing crime (Fajnzylber 
et al., 1998).
8
  In particular, we control whether the respondent is an entrepreneur as this group has 
allegedly been particularly targeted by cartels for extortion and kidnapping (Ravelo, 2012). The area 
characteristics we control for are: the Gini coefficient of the municipality and lagged for the years 
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 The ENSI for the year 2010 does not provide information on household’s income, so we control for the 
education level of the respondent.  
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2000 and 2005, and the unemployment rate at state level and lagged for the years of 2002 and 2006. 
We control for unemployment rates since the literature has found it strongly correlated with crime 
rates (Landau, 1998; Agnew, 1999). These theories argue that since employment constitutes the main 
legitimate mean for obtaining income, difficulty in gaining employment can increase frustration and 
the chances of resorting to crime. Although unemployment might induce crime, as crime increases, 
firms and entrepreneurs might be forced to move out to other areas thereby inducing more 
unemployment in the original location. In order to avoid a potential endogeneity between 
unemployment and crime rates, we use lagged information for unemployment rates. We also control 
for the inequality level at municipality level following the theories on strain and anomie, which 
suggest that the frustration of unsuccessful individuals increases when faced with the relative success 
of others around them. Thus, the higher the inequality, the more strain and the greater the inducement 
for low-status individuals to commit crime (Barkan, 2006). Since inequality might also be 
endogenously influenced by crime rates, we also use lagged information for the Gini coefficient 
(Fajnzylber et al., 2002). 
 
4.1 Change in crime 
To determine whether the crime occurred in a municipality treated by cartels (or drug-related 
homicides) we use the stated municipality of where the crime occurred, and not the respondent’s 
current area of residency.
 9
 Thus, in our regressions estimating the impact on crime we use the 
characteristics of the municipalities where the crimes occurred and not the characteristics of the areas 
where the respondent is currently living. We discard any reports where the respondent did not state in 
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 The survey asked about the crimes that occurred in the year prior to the interview,  that is 2004 and 2009. Thus, 
we identify the treatment areas by drug-related homicides as those areas that experienced at least one drug-
related homicide between 2006-2009, which broadly coincide with those treated by drug-related homicides 
during 2006-2010. (72 municipalities experienced drug-related homicides for the first time in 2010). There are 
no differences in the sampled ENSI municipalities that we identified as treated by drug-cartels but free of drug-
related homicides in 2006-2009 or 2006-2010.  
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which municipality the crime occurred. Table A.2 (in appendix) shows respondents stated the 
municipality of where crimes occurred for the great majority of cases across all types of crimes 
analyzed. 
 Tables A.4 to A.7 in the Appendix present the first-stage least squares instrumental variables 
(IV) regressions, and the validity test of our instruments, which show that the instruments are robust. 
We discuss these results in depth in sub-section 4.4.  
 Table 1, Panel A, shows the results of the IV-second-stage least squares panel-fixed effects 
regressions, which measure separately the impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on crime. 
Column (2) shows that the theft of car accessories increased by 16 percentage points in municipalities 
that had at least one drug-related homicide relative to their control group. Extortions also increased (by 
4.7 percentage points) as well as other thefts (by 6 percentage points) in municipalities treated by 
drug-related homicides, relative to the control group.  
 We also find a reduction in the percentage of respondents experiencing other kinds of crimes 
in the municipalities treated by drug-related homicides. The percentage of respondents that 
experienced house burglary declined (by 16 percentage points), as well as the percentage of those that 
experienced kidnappings (2.2 percentage points), sexual crimes (4.2 percentage points), fraud (3.6 
percentage points) and other types of crimes (12 percentage points).  
 This mixed evidence might be due to various factors. For example, when cartels operate in 
these areas they might focus on certain crimes (car accessories, extortions and other thefts) and reduce 
their efforts on other types of crimes. But there are other possibilities too. We have very few 
observations on reported kidnappings and sexual offenses in the survey, which might be due the 
hesitation of the respondent to reveal if they had suffered this kind of crimes and as mentioned earlier, 
due to the fact that the reported kidnappings refer to the instances where the respondent was affected 
directly, and not a family member, which obscures their real prevalence. The mixed evidence could 
also be related to the degree of variance in the number of drug-related homicides each treated 
municipality has experienced. It is possible that the more violent areas are experiencing other kinds of 
change in crime rates. To assess if there is any differences in the types of crime across municipalities 
we divide further our treated groups. 
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 Panel B shows the impact of drug related violence but on those municipalities in the top 10 
decile of drug-related homicides during 2006-2009. Among these areas we observe a different pattern 
of impact on crime. For instance, house burglary increased by 54.3 percentage points, and also other 
thefts increased by 40.4 percentage points relative to their control group. The increase of these crimes 
in the areas with most drug-related homicides is consistent with international literature that a high-
level of conflict is associated with property theft (Landau, 2003). As discussed earlier, the reason for 
the positive correlation we find could be driven by drug cartels taxing their residents to fund their 
ongoing turf conflicts.  
 In the areas worst affected by drug-related homicides, we also observe a reduction in mugging 
(column 4). The change in the behavior of respondents, shown in the next sub-section, which take 
more precautions for instance to reduce the risk of being victims of crime might also explain the 
observed reduction in muggings.  
 In Table 1, Panel D, we also show the impact on crime of drug-cartels but whenever they 
operate free of drug-related homicides. We find no statistically significant impact across 10 out of the 
12 types of crime analyzed. Crimes categorized as “other thefts” decreased (by 7 percentage points), in 
contrast to what occurred in the areas with drug-related homicides. Column (12) shows that “other 
crimes” increased; nonetheless these crimes are in relative terms of lesser frequency than the other 11 
types of crimes analyzed. Thus, this evidence supports our hypothesis that when cartels have a 
peaceful (i.e. with no homicides) monopoly of a plaza, cartels are more likely to concentrate their 
efforts on drug-trafficking, and less on committing other crimes such as thefts and extortions. 
 Since the incidence of some crimes increased but declined for others, we analyze next the 
probability of experiencing crime of any type. We find no change in this probability across any of the 







4.2 Change in perceptions and actions 
We estimate next the impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on respondent’s perception of 
unsafety. 
10
 In contrast to the previous sub-section, in our regressions here we use the characteristics of 
the municipalities where the respondent was residing at the time of the interview. Tables A.8 in the 
Appendix present the IV-first-stage least squares regressions which show that the instruments are 
robust. We discuss these results in depth in sub-section 4.4.  
 Table 2, shows the results of the IV-second-stage least squares panel-fixed effects regressions. 
We find that the percentage of respondents that believe crimes increased in their municipalities and 
those who feel unsafe in their municipalities increased in areas that experienced drug-related 
homicides, relative to their control group (Panel A, column 1 and 2). In contrast, we find no change in 
these perceptions of respondents living in areas that experienced drug cartels free of drug-related 
homicides relative to their control group (Panel B, column 1 and 2).  
 We find no difference in the change of the expressed mistrust for local police among 
respondents living in areas experiencing drug cartels or drug-related homicides relative to their control 
groups (column 3). Thus, the general increase in mistrust in local police cannot be attributed to drug 
cartels or the drug-related homicides alone. 
 In Table 2, columns (4)-(7), we explore the actions that the respondents have taken “as a 
result of being afraid of being victims of crime”. Among those who live in municipalities with drug-
related homicides the percentage of respondents who stated no longer go out at night increased (by 40 
percentage points), and so did the percentage who no longer visits friends and relatives (by 48 
percentage points), and who no longer uses public transport (by 24 percentage points). Again, we find 
no statistically significant change in these responses among those living in areas with drug cartels but 
free of drug-related homicides relative to their control group.  
                                                 
10
 In contrast to the previous section, the survey asked respondents about their perceptions on unsafety and 
actions taken to prevent crime referring to the year in which the survey was conducted (2005 or 2010). Thus, in 
this sub-section we identify the treatment areas with drug-related homicides as those areas that experienced at 
least one drug-related homicide between 2006 and 2010.  
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 In Table 3 we show evidence on the actions taken as a result of the perceived unsafety among 
our respondents using IV-second-stage least squares panel fixed-effects regression. The corresponding 
results of the IV-first-stage least squares regression are shown in Table A.9, and also discussed in sub-
section 4.4.  
 We find that on the one hand, there was no change in the percentage of respondents that 
acquired an insurance policy among those living in the areas affected by drug-related homicides, 
relative to their control group (Table 3, Panel A, column 1). On the other hand, the percentage who 
acquired an insurance policy declined (by 14 percentage points) among those living in areas affected 
by drug cartels but free of drug-related homicides (Table 3, Panel B, column 1). These contrasting 
results might be due to differences in the price of the insurance premiums, information which the 
ENSI survey does not provide.
11
 However, as we showed before, the theft of car accessories, for 
instance, only increased in the areas affected by drug-related homicides and not in areas with drug 
cartels without drug-related homicides. This suggests that if car insurance premiums increased they are 
more likely to have done so in areas affected by drug-related homicides.  
 We also find that the percentage of respondents that improved their security (by installing 
more locks, walls, alarms or getting a security dog) increased (by 70.5 percentage points), but only 
among the respondents living in municipalities affected by drug-related violence relative to their 
control group (Panel A, column 2). Similarly, the percentage who hired private police increased (by 33 
percentage points), but only among those living in areas with drug-related homicides relative to their 
control group (column 3). The only similarity we find across both types of treatment areas is that the 
respondents increased the security for their cars, relative to their control groups (column 4).   
 In Table 3, column (5) we analyze the probability of respondents moving of residency after 
experiencing a crime. The survey asked respondents whether they experienced crimes in the year 
previous to the interview and the location of that crime. However, the survey did not ask where the 
respondents were residing in that previous year. Thus, we determined whether the respondent moved 
                                                 
11
 Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2011a) shows there is a positive correlation in car insurance premiums and drug-related 
homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants at state level.    
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to a different municipality or state after experiencing house burglary by comparing the location 
(municipality and state) where the respondent was living at the time of the interview and the stated 
location of where the house burglary occurred over the previous year.  We find that across all 
respondents, only a small percentage (0.1%) moved to another municipality or state after experiencing 
house burglary (Table A.3).
12
  Moreover, in our difference-in-difference analysis we find no 
statistically significant change in the percentage that moved following a house burglary in the areas 
affected by drug cartels nor in the areas affected by drug-related homicides, relative to their control 
groups. However, it is likely that we are underestimating the probability of moving after suffering a 
crime for two reasons. First, we cannot identify the cases of respondents who moved residency but 
who did not experience house burglary in the previous year. Second, even for those who experienced 
burglary, we only know if they moved to a different municipality or state, but not if they relocated 
within the same municipality, perhaps to a safer neighborhood. 
 In Table 3, columns (6)-(8), we analyze other actions taken as a result of having experienced a 
crime. We find no difference in the percentage of respondents experiencing a crime and not reporting 
it officially to the authorities among the respondents living in areas with drug cartels or drug-related 
homicides, relatively to their control groups (column 6).  Thus, the level of impunity that might deter 
respondents reporting crimes could be similar across the treatment and control areas. 
 Among those who did report the crime experienced to the authorities, the outcome of the 
official report (whether nothing happened with the claim, or whether stolen items were recovered) was 
no different among respondents living in areas with drug cartels or drug-related homicides, relative to 
their control (columns 7 and 8).  
 
4.3 Simple comparison between treated and control areas in 2010 
We present next further differences in security spending and respondents’ assessment of the 
performance of authority between the treatment and their respective controls areas. We present this 
                                                 
12
 Estimating that percentage but only for the population who suffered a house burglary: 4.7% moved to another 
municipality or state over the following year in 2004, and 5.08% in 2009. 
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information only for the year 2010, given that these questions are available in the ENSI survey in 
2010, but not in the previous survey of 2004. To assess these differences between the treated and 
control areas we use the equation as shown in (2). We once again use an instrumental variable 
specification.  
                                         E(Yij |Zij)=  + δXij + ρMi +Treatedij + ij                            (2) 
 
where Yij represents the outcome variable of interest of respondent i in 2010 in the municipality j. X 
and M are the vectors of the respondent and area characteristics. Zij represents whether the 
municipality was decentralized in 2005. Since our outcome variables do not change over time, we only 
use as instrument a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality was decentralized or not in 
2005.  represents the difference in outcomes between respondents living  in the treated areas (by drug 
cartels or drug-related homicides) and those in the control group in 2010. 
 Tables A.10 in the Appendix present the IV-first-stage least squares regressions, the results of 
which we discuss in depth in sub-section 4.4.  Table 4, shows the corresponding IV-second-stage least 
squares regressions. In Table 4, column (1) we show the differences in security spending in 2010 
between areas treated by drug-related cartels or drug-related homicides, relative to their control 
groups. We find no differences in spending between respondents living in areas treated by at least one 
drug-related homicides and their control group. However, the respondents living in the areas most 
affected by drug-related homicides (those in the 10th decile of drug-related homicides) spend on 
average 1,166 dollars more in security than the respondents living in the control group (Panel B). In 
contrast, the respondents living in areas where drug cartels operate but free of drug-related homicides 
spend 1,417 USD dollars less in security than those respondents living in their respective control 
group (Panel D).  
 It is worth noting that since we do not have information about security spending in previous 
years, these differences in spending observed in 2010 are not necessarily being caused by the presence 
of drug-related homicides or cartels in these areas, as these areas might have spent higher amounts in 
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security previously. Nonetheless, the differences in spending reveal the extra burden on security 
spending that crime and violence can impose on households.  
 In column (2) we show further differences among respondents living in the two types of 
treated areas. The respondents living in areas affected by at least one drug-related homicide are 18 
percentage points more likely to believe that their participation with others in improving public 
security is important compared to their control group (panel A, column 2). However, we find no 
difference in this perception between those who are living in the top 10 decile of drug-related 
homicides, nor among those living in areas affected by drug cartels with no homicides and their 
respective control groups. Hence, as the social cohesion hypothesis suggests, drug-related homicides, 
as an extra pressure, may induce people to participate with others to take action against external 
pressures, but only in areas where such violence is occurring, and up to a certain level of violence. 
Beyond a certain level of conflict people might perceive that is too dangerous to participate in 
vigilante activities for instance. 
 In column (3) we examine whether the perceptions about impunity differ between respondents 
living in treated and control areas. It is important to examine these differences, as the theoretical and 
empirical literature have shown the higher the level of (perceived) impunity the higher the crime rates 
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; 1996). We find that among the respondents living in areas affected by at 
least one drug-related homicide, the perception that criminals are punished if they commit a crime in 
their municipality is 10 percentage points higher than those in their respective control group. This 
statistically significant difference is no longer found once we further divide the treated areas according 
to the level of drug-related homicides (in top 10 decile or bottom 9th decile), nor among the areas 
where drug cartels operate without drug-related homicides relative to their control group. 
 To conclude our analysis, in Table 4, column (4), we show that those living in the areas most 
affected by drug-related homicides, in the top 10 deciles, are 8 percentage points less likely to agree 
that the strategy of the federal government to tackle organized crime is working, relative to its control 
group. In contrast, those living in the bottom 9th decile of drug-related homicides, or where cartels 
operate but without drug-related homicides are more likely to agree that the federal action against 
organized crime is working. 
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4.4 Robustness checks 
The validity of our identification strategy depends on two key factors: the robustness of our 
instrumental variable and that the municipalities used as a treatment (either for drug cartels or drug-
related violence) and control group have had similar parallel trends in crimes before treatment began.  
 As mentioned earlier, previous research has shown the relevance of the decentralization 
instrument we use in explaining the probability of experiencing drug cartels and drug-related violence. 
To check the validity of the instrument used, in the appendix (Tables A.4-A.10) we present the first-
stage regression of the IV approach for all the estimations shown in section 4.  These tables also 
include the coefficients associated with our decentralization instrument and our treatments 
(municipalities experiencing drug-related homicides or drug cartels). We find that the instrument is 
statistically significant in 95 out of the 96 regressions presented.  For instance, in Table A.5 we show 
the first stage results of the impact of drug-related homicides in the top 10 decile on crimes. The 
instrument used, decentralization*post, is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that areas 
that were decentralized were more likely to have a high-intensity level of drug-related homicides, as 
the literature suggests.  Table A.6 also shows that areas decentralized were less likely to have drug 
cartels operating peacefully (without drug-related homicides), also supporting the predictions of the 
literature. As we discussed in Section 2, we would expect that these cartels free of drug-related 
homicides to be more likely to operate in coordinated regimes, not in decentralized ones. 
 At the bottom of each of the Tables A.4 to A.10 we present the under-identification tests, 
which show that the excluded instrument, decentralization, is correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. The F-test across all tables show that we do not have any weak instrument problem given 
that in all models the p value is very small. In addition, the F-test is greater than 10 in 92 out of the 96 
regressions presented.  
 To assess the size of the bias in our IV estimates, due to a potential weak correlation between 
the IV used and the endogenous regressors, we present the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, and 
compare it to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values. Across all our estimators the size of that 
bias is around 10%.  
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 We also show the endogeneity test of the treatment variables (drug- cartels or drug-related 
homicides). The null hypothesis of the endogeneity test is that the treatment measure is exogenous, 
thus no IVs are needed. We do find evidence of endogeneity across several models, although not all, at 
the 10 percent confidence level.  
 We now move on to discuss the validity of the parallel trends between our treatment and 
control groups. To test these trends we would need to have information about crime rates at 
municipality level. Given that there are no crime rates available at this level, we test instead if the 
municipalities used as treatment and control groups had similar homicide rates, a close proxy for 
criminality in the past. In Figures 5 and 6 we show that both our treatments analyzed (drug-related 
homicides and drug cartels free of drug-related homicides) had parallel trends in homicides rates with 
respect to their control group at least in the 10 years before the treatment began. It is only after 2007 
that homicide rates sharply increased in the municipalities treated by drug-related homicides, but not 
in the controls. Interestingly, the general homicide rates remained below the national level for the 
municipalities treated by cartels but that did not have drug-related homicides and its respective control 
group (Figure 6).   Thus, this evidence suggests that the municipalities used as controls are a suitable 
group off which to build the counterfactual of what would have happened to the treated municipalities, 
in the absence of the treatment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper estimated the impact of drug cartels and separately drug-related homicides on the 
probability of suffering a crime and on the perceptions of security. To this end we combined nationally 
representative surveys on crime with indicators of where drug cartels operate with and without drug-
related homicides.  
 Our findings reveal a contrasting picture of how residents have been affected across different 
areas. The perception of unsafety increased among the respondents living in areas affected by drug-
related homicides.  These respondents also take more measures towards increasing their security, 
spending on average about 1,166 US dollars more in security than those living in areas not affected by 
drug-related homicides. This is a non-negligible amount in security expenditure for a middle-income 
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country, which could be contributing to the impoverishment and migration out of these violent areas. 
In contrast, the perceptions of unsafety do not change in areas where cartels operate without leading to 
drug-related homicides, and respondents living in these areas spent on average even less resources 
than those free of cartels and drug-related homicides.   
 The probability of experiencing the main types of crime analyzed remained unchanged,  thefts 
even declined where cartels have the full monopoly of the area where they operate, without facing 
conflicts leading to drug-related homicides.   This result could be due to cartels choosing to specialize 
on drug-activities, and not on committing other crimes in these areas. This effect could also be 
reinforced if the police are no longer chasing cartel members, but allowing them to operate freely, so 
the police can focus their efforts on non-drug-related crimes.
13
 In contrast, certain crimes did increase 
where cartels battle for turf, with evidence of drug-related homicides. We cannot rule out that the 
spike in certain crimes in these areas is being driven by police resources being deviated towards 
chasing cartels, thereby congesting law-enforcement (Gaviria, 2000). However, we do not find a 
generalized rise in crime rates in these areas, but rather a pattern where those crimes that require more 
sophisticated organization increased, such as extortion and other theft. Thus, our results are more 
supportive of the hypothesis that when cartels face battles for turf these conflicts increase cartels’ 
security expenses, and as a result cartels resort to taxing locals through theft and extortion to fund their 
ongoing conflicts. 
 Our results confirm the assumptions made by previous studies arguing that drug-cartels 
increase crime rates and perceptions of unsafety. However, our study reveals that this is the case only 
when drug-cartels are battling for turf and not when cartels operate without disputes leading to drug-
related homicides. Thus, our findings help deepen the understanding of when cartels’ drug-trafficking 
activities lead to other crimes and some of the consequences on the local population. 
 
                                                 
13
 For instance, in a short-lived depenalization of cannabis in Lambeth, a borough of London, Adda et al. (2014) 
find that the overall crime rate declined as result of the police being able to divert resources towards dealing with 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Sequential game between authority and cartels under decentralized and coordinated regimes 
 
 














Figure 4. Municipalities used as controls and treated with cartels but not drug-related homicides. 
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Figure 5. Homicide Rates across municipalities used as controls and treated with drug-related 
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Figure 6. Homicide Rates across municipalities used as controls and treated with cartels but not drug-
related homicides. Source: Homicide rates INEGI; drug-related homicides SNSP; population 















Table 1: Impact of Drug-Related Homicides and Cartels on Crime Rates. IV Panel Fixed Effects at Municipality Level 
Dependent variable> Car theft
Theft of car 
accessories
Household 








any kind of  
crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Panel A: Controls vs all treated municipalities 
by drug-related homicides
DID 0.005 0.160*** -0.163*** 0.029 -0.022*** -0.027 -0.042*** -0.036** 0.047* 0.060** -0.119*** -0.054
(0.017) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035) (0.006) (0.024) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.080)
Number respondents 57,525 57,470 57,518 57,342 57,529 57,502 57,532 57,530 57,513 57,519 57,520 57,827
Number municipalities 827 827 827 829 827 827 827 827 828 827 828 842
Panel B: Controls vs treated municipalities 
top 10 decile drug-related homicides
DID -0.141 0.196 0.543* -0.397* 0.041 0.178 0.051 0.032 0.066 0.404** 0.011 1.140
(0.087) (0.199) (0.294) (0.236) (0.033) (0.159) (0.049) (0.090) (0.120) (0.189) (0.185) (1.034)
Number respondents 17,768 17,728 17,755 17,684 17,768 17,752 17,768 17,767 17,760 17,760 17,765 17,639
Number municipalities 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 443 442 443 450
Panel C: Controls vs treated municipalities in 
bottom 9 deciles of drug-related homicides
DID 0.003 0.133*** -0.122*** 0.015 -0.020*** -0.025 -0.037*** -0.030** 0.041* 0.051** -0.101*** -0.048
(0.016) (0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.006) (0.022) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.073)
Number respondents 54,936 54,883 54,933 54,755 54,940 54,918 54,944 54,940 54,923 54,932 54,927 55,230
Number municipalities 771 771 771 773 771 771 771 771 772 771 771 784
Panel D: Controls vs treated by cartels but no 
drug-related homicides
DID 0.014 -0.042 -0.040 -0.003 0.001 -0.025 -0.009 0.008 -0.020 -0.070* 0.075* -0.107
(0.015) (0.038) (0.051) (0.036) (0.003) (0.028) (0.010) (0.017) (0.024) (0.038) (0.040) (0.098)
Number respondents 10,850 10,830 10,845 10,799 10,850 10,840 10,850 10,849 10,839 10,845 10,844 10,755
Number municipalities 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 283  
Note: DID is the difference-in-difference effect when comparing treated vs. control areas. Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. 
Controls used but omitted in table: respondent’s gender, age, education, whether entrepreneur, size of household, lagged gini coefficient (2000 and 2005) 
aggregated at municipality level and measured in natural logarithm and unemployment rate at state level and lagged (2002 and 2006). 
Instrument used to deal with endogenity of treatment: The interaction between whether the municipality was decentralized after 2005 and a post-treatment 
dummy variable.  Deciles are constructed according to the total number of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced 
during 2006-2009.  
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 










Believes living in 
this municipality 
is unsafe
Does not trust 
the local police










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Controls vs all treated municipalities by drug-
related homicides
DID 0.764*** 0.270* 0.156 0.398** 0.482*** 0.070 0.236*
(0.161) (0.155) (0.134) (0.155) (0.132) (0.214) (0.129)
Number respondents 55,716 56,988 45,206 52,938 55,770 35,475 47,311
Number municipalities 827 827 827 827 827 789 825
Panel B: Controls vs treated by cartels but no drug-
related homicides
DID 0.239 0.374 0.143 0.004 0.160 -0.130 -0.050
(0.245) (0.233) (0.245) (0.221) (0.184) (0.522) (0.163)
Number respondents 10,447 10,735 8,394 9,898 10,497 5,049 8,969
Number municipalities 281 281 281 281 281 258 280  
Note: DID is the difference-in-difference effect when comparing treated vs. control areas. Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. 
Controls used but omitted in table: respondent’s gender, age, education, whether entrepreneur, size of household, lagged gini coefficient (2000 and 2005) 
aggregated at municipality level and measured in natural logarithm and unemployment rate at state level and lagged (2002 and 2006). 
Instrument used to deal with endogenity of treatment: The interaction between whether the municipality was decentralized after 2005 and a post-treatment 
dummy variable.  Deciles are constructed according to the total number of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced 
during 2006-2010. 
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 

























and moved of 
address afterwards
Experienced crime, 
but did not officially 
report crime
Officially reported 
crime, but nothing 
happened as a result
Officially reported crime, 
and recovered stolen 
items
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Controls vs all treated municipalities 
by drug-related homicides
DID 0.021 0.705*** 0.329*** 0.373*** -0.043 0.398 -1.566 0.385
(0.044) (0.150) (0.056) (0.081) (0.887) (0.384) (1.121) (0.799)
Number respondents 56,706 57,324 56,717 48,335 872 4,508 1,058 960
Number municipalities 827 827 827 825 141 379 162 149
Panel B: Controls vs treated by cartels but no 
drug-related homicides
DID -0.141*** 0.168 0.027 0.161* 4.876 -2.776 1.233 0.421
(0.046) (0.221) (0.051) (0.083) (24.260) (2.190) (2.143) (1.463)
Number respondents 10,639 10,801 10,591 8,515 623 3,173 776 696
Number municipalities 281 281 281 280 113 335 138 125
As a result of insecurity respondent: 
 
Note: DID is the difference-in-difference effect when comparing treated vs. control areas. Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. 
Controls used but omitted in table: respondent’s gender, age, education, whether entrepreneur, size of household, lagged gini coefficient (2000 and 2005) 
aggregated at municipality level and measured in natural logarithm and unemployment rate at state level and lagged (2002 and 2006). 
Instrument used to deal with endogenity of treatment: The interaction between whether the municipality was decentralized after 2005 and a post-treatment 
dummy variable.  Deciles are constructed according to the total number of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced 
during 2006-2010. 
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 
























(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Controls vs all treated municipalities by drug-related homicides
Respondent living in municipality treated by drug-related homicides 246.598 0.179** 0.103* 0.414***
(588.675) (0.075) (0.056) (0.087)
Number respondents 9,071 28,576 28,833 27,968
Panel B: Controls vs treated municipalities top 10 decile drug-related homicides
Respondent living in municipality treated by drug-related homicides 1,165.624*** -0.121 0.058 -0.826***
(385.299) (0.179) (0.137) (0.204)
Number respondents
1,828 7,055 7,156 6,837
Panel C: Controls vs treated municipalities in bottom 9 deciles of drug-related homicides
Respondent living in municipality treated by drug-related homicides 164.132 0.112* 0.049 0.336***
(525.091) (0.067) (0.050) (0.077)
Number respondents
8,920 27,891 28,128 27,303
Panel D: Controls vs treated by cartels but no drug-related homicides
-1,417.332*** -0.014 -0.148 0.912***
Respondent living in municipality treated by cartels but no drug-related homicides (514.038) (0.157) (0.114) (0.196)
Number respondents 1,377 5,466 5,546 5,282  
 
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Controls used but omitted in table: respondent’s gender, age, education, whether 
entrepreneur, size of household, lagged gini coefficient (2000 and 2005) aggregated at municipality level and measured in natural logarithm and 
unemployment rate at state level and lagged (2002 and 2006). 
Instrument used to deal with endogenity of treatment: Whether the municipality was decentralized after 2005. Deciles are constructed according to the total 
number of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced during 2006-2010. 
Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A.1 Main Characteristics of Respondents 
 
Treated by cartels but no drug-related homicides
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Female 52.6 52.3 55.9 52.5 52.3 52.4 55.9 52.5 53.4 51.9 56.0 52.4 55.9 52.9
Aged 18-30 35.0 33.0 34.6 34.7 34.8 33.9 34.6 34.7 33.1 30.5 34.2 34.9 34.1 31.3
Selected respondent has highschool or more 33.9 22.1 16.9 10.7 27.7 18.1 16.9 10.7 19.6 11.7 15.7 8.6 18.4 14.9
Is an entrepreneur/self-employed 18.9 17.4 25.0 19.0 19.3 17.7 25.0 19.0 21.8 20.1 25.0 19.9 22.2 18.2
During previous year, a member of the 
respondent’s household suffered a crime in 
the state of current residency 10.3 13.9 4.4 5.2 7.4 9.8 4.4 5.2 4.6 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.7 5.3
Before of last year, respondent was a victim 
of crime 22.2 14.7 10.8 7.1 17.0 11.2 10.8 7.1 12.8 8.5 9.7 5.8 12.8 9.0
Number of respondents 57,398   60,461   5,966       6,615       22,208       22,790       5,966         6,615         2,731         2,488         4,232         4,666         943                      1,011 
Treated Group
Drug-related homicides top 10 decile




Note: Percentages are obtained using the respondent’s survey sampling weight. Deciles are constructed according to the total number of drug-related 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced during 2006-2010. 


















Table A.2: Type of crime that the respondent suffered during the year previous to the interview 
 
2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010
Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs Obs
Car theft 367 545 367 536 1 11 56 107 1 11 1 1 1 3 0 1
Theft of car accessories 1001 1748 1001 1741 19 58 254 586 19 58 5 10 6 26 3 2
Household Burglary 1775 1406 1770 1403 101 78 429 444 101 78 9 11 39 34 12 11
Mugging 1229 1516 1228 1485 34 40 270 414 34 40 3 1 17 19 3 1
Kidnapping 41 41 41 41 1 3 5 13 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0
Extorsion* 125 798 123 793 7 43 29 269 7 43 0 1 4 20 1 5
Lesions 495 300 495 298 40 18 151 104 40 18 8 1 20 7 4 5
Sexual crime 96 43 96 42 7 1 37 19 7 1 1 1 4 0 0 1
Fraud 112 188 112 186 11 15 43 52 11 15 3 0 6 7 2 2
Other theft* 500 644 499 501 50 31 160 143 50 31 0 2 34 18 7 6
Other crimes* 1023 142 1019 140 90 16 271 41 90 16 12 1 46 10 17 2
Had some kind of crime 7,267 7,371 7256 7,166 369 314 1,870 2,192 369 314 40 30 179 145 48 36
Treated Group
Treated by cartels but no drug-related 
homicides
All country
All crimes, including 
those of unkown 
location
All crimes, including those of unkown location
Treated Group
Drug-related homicides Drug-related homicides top 10 decile
Control Group Treated GroupAll country Control Group Control Group
 
 
Note: Data not weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. *Some respondents reported experienced extortions, other theft and other crimes more than 
once in the previous year to the interview. Only for these instances the observations refer to the number of instances the crime was committed, for the rest of 
crimes refer to the number of people who experienced these crimes. Deciles are constructed according to the total number of drug-related homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants the municipalities experienced during 2006-2009. Source: ENSI 2005 and 2010. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with 
operating narcos, Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.3: Respondents' Perceptions about Unsafety 
2005 2010
Percentage Percentage
Experienced crime and moved of address afterwards 0.1 0.1
Among those that experienced crime,  did not officially report crime 75.9 76.2
Believes crime increased in municipality 40.9 53.8
Believes living in this municipality is unsafe 40.4 54.9
Does not trust the local police 76.6 89.8
No longer goes out at night 39.6 44.3
No longer visits friends and relatives 23.2 26.2
No longer uses taxis 25.0 25.2
No longer uses public transport 12.8 16.6
Bought an insurance policy 3.1 3.1
Improved security (locks, walls, alarms, got a dog) 41.1 28.1
Hired private police 5.4 3.0
Increased security in car 12.8 12.2
Because being afraid of crime 
respondent:
As a result of insecurity respondent: 
 
Note: Percentages are obtained using the respondent’s survey sampling weight. Source: ENSI 2005 






































Table A.4 First Stage IV Results from Difference-in-Difference Controls vs. Respondents living in municipalities treated by at least one drug-related 
homicides 
Dependent variable> Car theft
Theft of car 
accessories
Household 








kind of  
crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Post-treatment dummy 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.796*** 0.802***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Respondent is a female 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education 
level -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s size of household -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime 
ocurred -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.213*** -0.215*** -0.213*** -0.212*** -0.214*** -0.212*** -0.200***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime 
ocurred -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized 
in 2005*Post treatment dummy -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.783 0.784 0.787
Observations 57525 57470 57518 57342 57529 57502 57532 57530 57513 57519 57520 57827
F test of excluded instruments:  286.77  283.04 281.10 283.65 283.54 287.84 281.93  283.92 285.27 286.37 284.24  311.98
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 285.4 281.7 279.8 283.6 282.2 286.4 280.6 282.6 283.9 285.0 282.9 310.3
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 286.8 283.0 281.1 283.6 283.5 287.8 281.9 283.9 285.3 286.4 284.2 312.0
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4

























Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.04 13.95 16.71 0.46 12.82 1.35 13.262 6.28 2.21 5.11 21.01 0.93
p value 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.33  
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006).Treated municipalities by at least one drug-related homicides during 2006-2009. Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with 
operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.5 First Stage IV Results from Difference-in-Difference Controls vs. Treated Municipalities in Top 10 Decile of Drug-Related Homicides 
Car theft
Theft of car 
accessories
Household 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Post-treatment dummy 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.116***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Respondent is a female 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education level 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Respondent’s size of household -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime 
ocurred 0.053** 0.054** 0.054** 0.052** 0.053** 0.055** 0.053** 0.052** 0.054** 0.054** 0.052** 0.053*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime 
ocurred -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.062***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 
2005*Post treatment dummy 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.013*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
R2 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.109
Observations 17768 17728 17755 17684 17768 17752 17768 17767 17760 17760 17765 17639
F test of excluded instruments: 13.79 13.75 13.64 9.35 13.71 13.32 13.81 14.32 13.68 13.87 14.27  2.94
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 13.78 13.75 13.63 9.35 13.71 13.32 13.81 14.31 13.68 13.86 14.26 9.71
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 13.79 13.75 13.64 9.35 13.71 13.32 13.81 14.32 13.68 13.87 14.27 9.71
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 2.94

























Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 3.50 1.08 4.62 4.31 1.67 1.51 1.20 0.23 0.33 6.12 0.01 1.95
p value 0.06 0.30 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.63 0.56 0.01 0.92 0.16  
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006). Treated municipalities in top 10 deciles of drug-related homicides during 2006-2009. Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with 
operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.6 First Stage IV Results from Difference-in-Difference Controls vs. Bottom 9 Deciles Treated by Drug-Related Homicides 
Car theft
Theft of car 
accessories
Household 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Post-treatment dummy 0.790*** 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.789*** 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.789*** 0.795***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Respondent is a female 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education level -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Respondent’s size of household -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime ocurred -0.211*** -0.205*** -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.196***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime ocurred -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 
2005*Post treatment dummy -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.071***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.776 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.778
Observations 54936 54883 54933 54755 54940 54918 54944 54940 54923 54932 54927 55230
F test of excluded instruments: 195.04 193.97 195.32 208.79 195.31 196.03 196.80 194.85 193.56 193.088 192.25 204.76
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 191.7 190.6 191.9 204.9 191.9 192.6 193.4 191.5 190.2 196.5 189.0 201.0
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 195.0 194.0 195.3 208.8 195.3 196.0 196.8 194.9 193.6 196.5 192.2 204.8
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4

























Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.60 0.76 0.60 0.01 0.18 0.92 1.09 0.11 0.55 3.30 4.50 1.03
p value 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.92 0.67 0.34 0.30 0.74 0.46 0.07 0.03 0.31  
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006). Treated municipalities in bottom 9 deciles of drug-related homicides during 2006-2009. Significance Level * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities 
with operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.7 First Stage IV Results from Difference-in-Difference Controls vs. Treated by Cartels 
Car theft
Theft of car 
accessories
Household 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13)
Post-treatment dummy 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Respondent is a female 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Respondent’s age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education 
level 0.007* 0.006 0.007* 0.008** 0.007* 0.007 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Respondent’s size of household 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime 
ocurred -0.958*** -0.960*** -0.957*** -0.954*** -0.958*** -0.960*** -0.958*** -0.958*** -0.960*** -0.961*** -0.959*** -0.957***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime 
ocurred 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.121***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 
2005*Post treatment dummy -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.096***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
R2 0.317 0.316 0.316 0.315 0.317 0.317 0.316 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.316 0.314
Observations 10850 10830 10845 10799 10850 10840 10850 10849 10839 10845 10844 10755
F test of excluded instruments: 193.97 193.97 195.32 208.79  195.31 196.03 196.80 194.85 193.56 196.52 192.25 204.76
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 195.04 190.63 191.94 204.90 191.93 192.62 193.36 191.48 190.24 193.09 188.97 201.00
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 135.3 194.0 195.3 208.8 195.3 196.0 196.8 194.9 193.6 196.5 192.2 204.8
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4

























Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.60 0.76 0.60 0.01 0.18 0.92 1.09 0.11 0.55 3.30 4.50 1.03
p value 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.92 0.67 0.34 0.30 0.74 0.46 0.07 0.03 0.31  
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006). Treated municipalities with cartels operating in 2006 or after but no drug-related homicides during 2006-2009. Significance 
Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides 
SNSP. Municipalities with operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Post-treatment dummy 0.879*** 0.878*** 0.883*** 0.881*** 0.879*** 0.900*** 0.870*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.106***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Respondent is a female 0.003** 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Respondent’s age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.006** 0.006** 0.004** 0.005** 0.006** 0.001 0.009*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education level -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.010** 0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Respondent’s size of household -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime ocurred 0.001 0.001 0.027 -0.003 0.001 0.067*** 0.006 -0.666*** -0.692*** -0.643*** -0.663*** -0.666*** -0.317*** -0.613***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044) (0.042) (0.065) (0.045)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime 
ocurred -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.002 -0.012*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.135*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.180*** 0.143***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 
2005*Post treatment dummy -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.075*** -0.093*** -0.084*** -0.036*** -0.074***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
R2 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.847 0.845 0.877 0.843 0.270 0.274 0.256 0.273 0.269 0.282 0.249
Observations 55716 56988 45206 52938 55770 35475 47311 10447 10735 8394 9898 10497 5049 8969
F test of excluded instruments: 363.75 348.09 331.04 363.73 366.71 150.53 220.83 199.18 193.14 156.66  223.09 202.39 20.88 148.05
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 361.41 346.00 328.66 361.27 364.34 149.92 219.83 195.52 189.80 153.86 218.23 198.63 20.83 145.72
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 363.75 348.09 331.04 363.73 366.71 150.53 220.84 199.18 193.14 156.66 223.09 202.39 20.88 148.05
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38





















Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 19.49 1.73 1.18 5.00 11.91 0.06 2.72 0.85 2.23 0.27 0.01 0.82 0.06 0.03
p value 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.81 0.10 0.36 0.14 0.61 0.95 0.36 0.81 0.86
Respondents living in municipalities used as control vs treated by drug-related 
homicides
Respondents living in municipalities used as control vs treated by cartels but not drug-
related homicides
 
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006). Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, 
unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.9: First Stage IV impact of Drug-Related Homicides and Cartels on Respondent’s Actions 



































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) (15) (12) (13)
Post-treatment dummy 0.878*** 0.878*** 0.878*** 0.892*** 0.954*** 0.995*** 1.028*** 1.007*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.102*** -0.001 -0.008** -0.015 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Respondent is a female 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** -0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Respondent’s age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.017* -0.001 -0.013* -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education level -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.008* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.000 -0.001 -0.010** -0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Respondent’s size of household -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005** 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.003* -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime ocurred -0.006 0.000 -0.005 -0.020 -0.042 0.096** 0.262*** 0.092 -0.949*** -0.958*** -0.955*** -1.027*** -0.012 -0.068** -0.061 -0.049
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.084) (0.038) (0.065) (0.057) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.023) (0.024) (0.058) (0.059)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime 
ocurred -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.020** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.006* 0.012*** 0.020** 0.015**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 
2005*Post treatment dummy -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.074*** 0.037* -0.083*** -0.075*** -0.047*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.090*** -0.131*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
R2 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.857 0.943 0.940 0.964 0.974 0.311 0.316 0.312 0.345 0.015 0.028 0.062 0.044
Observations 56706 57324 56717 48335 872 4508 1058 960 10639 10801 10591 8515 623 3173 776 696
F test of excluded instruments: 378.27 357.98 361.94 494.17 3.27 100.14 24.57 12.28 192.62  196.19 177.36 281.02 0.12 15.96 13.49 6.65
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.01
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 375.8 355.8 359.7 489.2 3.3 98.0 24.1 12.2 189.3 192.8 174.5 272.0 0.1 15.9 13.4 6.7
p value 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.01
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 378.3 358.0 361.9 494.2 3.3 100.1 24.6 12.3 192.6 196.2 177.4 281.0 0.1 16.0 13.5 6.7
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4






identified exactly identified exactly identified
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.1 23.0 42.5 22.1 0.0 1.6 2.6 0.3 10.0 0.6 0.1 2.5 0.0 2.1 0.3 0.1
p value 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.7
Respondents living in municipalities used as control vs treated by drug-related homicides
 
Note: Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level 
and lagged (2002 and 2006). Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, 
unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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Table A.10 First Stage IV differences in security spending, participation and impunity in 2010 between respondents living in controls and treated 
municipalities  
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Post-treatment dummy -0.008 0.017 -0.009 0.022 -0.003 0.012* -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.018) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Respondent is a female -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Respondent’s age -0.007 -0.029* -0.005 -0.023 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 -0.000 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.001
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.022) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Respondent is an entrepreneur 0.057*** -0.002 0.059*** 0.048* 0.051*** -0.007 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.052*** -0.010 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.049*** -0.007 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.026) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015)
Respondent’s has highschool or higher education level -0.006** -0.010** -0.006** -0.005 -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Respondent’s size of household 0.886*** 0.344*** 0.883*** 0.468*** 0.987*** 0.534*** 0.976*** 0.441*** 0.984*** 0.532*** 0.972*** 0.413*** 0.990*** 0.532*** 0.979*** 0.429***
(0.044) (0.058) (0.044) (0.088) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) (0.045) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) (0.045) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.046)
Lagged Ln Gini of the municipality where crime ocurred 0.071*** -0.013* 0.073*** 0.058*** 0.076*** -0.018*** 0.080*** 0.044*** 0.075*** -0.019*** 0.078*** 0.045*** 0.073*** -0.020*** 0.077*** 0.044***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Lagged unemployment rate of the state where crime ocurred -0.045*** 0.082*** -0.052*** -0.083*** -0.072*** 0.059*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.071*** 0.058*** -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.072*** 0.063*** -0.080*** -0.079***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.018) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Municipality where crime ocurred was decentralized in 2005 1.383*** 0.359*** 1.375*** 0.401*** 1.433*** 0.562*** 1.411*** 0.438*** 1.439*** 0.566*** 1.417*** 0.423*** 1.446*** 0.559*** 1.426*** 0.436***
(0.039) (0.058) (0.040) (0.095) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.047) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.046) (0.024) (0.033) (0.025) (0.048)
R2 0.066 0.065 0.068 0.064 0.079 0.056 0.082 0.059 0.078 0.057 0.081 0.058 0.077 0.059 0.080 0.057
Observations 9071 1828 8920 1377 28576 7055 27891 5466 28833 7156 28128 5546 27968 6837 27303 5282
F test of excluded instruments: 30.07 44.05 37.86 21.04 214.63 74.81 255.219 72.60 210.93 71.86 252.88 74.51  278.57 82.52 250.320 73.24
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underidentification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 30.0 43.2 37.7 20.9 213.092 74.114 257.493 71.761 209.467 71.233 250.709 73.64 209.26 81.645 252.553 72.363
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 30.1 44.0 37.9 21.0 214.626 74.806 3.245 72.596 210.934 71.859 252.883 74.51 209.258 82.523 333.653 73.243
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values 10% maximal 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4

































Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: 0.03 9.91 0.00 10.55 6.536 0.306 3.553 0.201 3.645 0.917 1.009 2.519 26.468 15.963 21.24 24.2
p value 0.86 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.58 0.07 0.65 0.06 0.34 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spent in security USD
Believes his/her participation is important to 
reduce crime
Believes that criminals are punished in this 
municipality
Believes federal goverment strategy against 
organised crime is working
 
Note: Panel A: Controls vs. all treated municipalities by drug-related homicides. Panel B: Controls vs. treated municipalities top 10 decile drug-related 
homicides. Panel C: Controls vs. treated municipalities in bottom 9 deciles of drug-related homicides. Panel D: Controls vs. treated by cartels but no drug-
related homicides.  
Data are weighted by respondent’s survey sampling weight. Gini at municipality level and lagged (2000 and 2005). Unemployment rate at state level and 
lagged (2002 and 2006). Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Source: ENSI 2005, 2010. Gini, 
unemployment INEGI. Drug-related homicides SNSP. Municipalities with operating narcos Gutiérrez-Romero and Oviedo (2014). 
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